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Abstract
A discovery system for detecting correspondences in data is described, based on the familiar induction
methods of J. S. Mill. Given a set of observations, the system induces the “causally” related facts in
these observations. Its application to empirical linguistic discovery is described. The paper is organized
as follows. I begin the discussion by revealing two developments, the transformationalists’ critique of
“discovery procedures” and naive inductivism, which have led to the neglect of discovery issues, arguing
that more attention needs to be paid to discovery in linguistics. Then, Mill’s methods are introduced,
and the system, incorporating them, is described, using as one illustration the discovery of (a part of)
the famous Germanic Consonant Shift, known as Grimm’s Law.
1 Introduction
Scientific discovery was one of the favourite topics of Renaissance scholars (F. Bacon, Descartes, Leibnitz).
These early efforts suffered a long period of oblivion (basically, due to the critiques of Whewell and Hume),
but this century has witnessed a steady, though perhaps not a completely uninterrupted, 1 process of revival
of interest. Very significant contributions to a general understanding of the discovery process have come
from various scientific disciplines, incl. mathematics (Poincare´, Hadamard, Polya), psychology (Wertheimer,
Duncker), philosophy (Nickles 1980b, Nickles 1980c), and AI (Newell and Simon 1972, Langley, Simon,
Bradshaw and Z˙ytkow 1987); cf. also the collection of more recent advances (Shrager and Langley 1990). In
effect, in many disciplines to date discovery is considered quite a respectable object of investigation.
Contemporary linguistics, unfortunately, did not follow the general tendency in the other sciences. In
the next section, I briefly discuss two major reasons for this state of affairs, arguing that more attention
needs to be paid to discovery in linguistics. Then, J. S. Mill’s methods for induction are introduced, and
a system incorporating these methods is described, using as illustrations a simple deciphering problem and
the discovery of (a part of) the famous Germanic Consonant Shift, known as Grimm’s Law.
2 The Problem of Discovery in Linguistics
2.1 The Transformationalists’ Critique of Discovery Procedures
The study of discovery in linguistics is not fashionable today. Discovery has had its good days, reaching
its climax in the works of American descriptivists, and esp. Zellig Harris (Harris 1951). The heritage from
descriptivists, however, is by no means uncontroversial. It is indeed true that their “discovery procedures”
(of a segmentation-and-classification type), purporting to uncover the grammar of a language from a corpus
of that language, significantly contributed to the understanding of the process, and served as a basis for
1I have in mind esp. the banning of discovery from the realm of a science like philosophy until the late fifties (cf. Hanson
1958), triggered by Popper’s denunciation of a logic of discovery in his classic The Logic of Scientific Discovery (German original
Logik der Forschung from 1935); for a discussion, cf. e.g. Simon 1973, Nickles 1980a.
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later grammar learning systems and toolkits for linguistic fieldwork. However, the descriptivists’ reduction
of linguistic theory to a manual of procedures, and doing linguistics to following these procedures proved to
be a too extreme and simplistic view to act as an incentive for the further study of discovery issues by later
generations of linguists.
The attempts of descriptivists, even if somewhat one-sided, suffered a severe blow with the advent of
transformationalists. In his influential book Syntactic Structures Chomsky made a devastating criticism
of descriptivists’ discovery procedures, totally shifting the focus on grammar justification. He stated of
linguistic theory that its “fundamental concern...is the problem of justification of grammars” (Chomsky
1957: 49; italics mine); and “we shall never consider how one might have arrived at the grammar”, whether
this be “by intuition, guess-work, all sorts of partial methodological hints, reliance on past experience, etc.”
(op. cit. p. 56).
Chomsky expressed his doubt as to the attainability in principle of the discovery task by descriptivist
techniques:
I think that it is very questionable that this goal is attanable in any interesting way, and
I suspect that any attempt to meet it will lead into a maze of more and more elaborate and
complex analytic procedures that will fail to provide answers for many important questions
about the nature of linguistic structure. (pp. 52-53).
...it is questionable whether /procedures of analysis/ can be formulated rigorously, exhaustively
and simply enough to qualify as practical and mechanical discovery procedure. (p. 56; italics
mine).
He also objected to some concrete attempts in this direction, arguing that despite their proclaimed
goal, they are not in fact discovery, but rather “evaluation procedures”, helpful for choosing from among
alternative grammars, already discovered in some way or another (p. 52, fn.3).
Chomsky’s disciples followed suit. Another influential transformationalist, Dougherty, in a review article
on linguistic methodology simply repeated Chomsky’s words:
I have nothing to say about the creative process by which a linguist develops a new grammar,
I am only concerned with the method of selecting the superior grammar from a given field of
proposed grammars. (Dougherty 1973: 435).
and Teeter 1964 comments on the question in an article with the indicative title Descriptive linguistic in
America: triviality vs. irrelevance, to mention but a few of the published reactions.
Thus, more than 20 years after Popper, and in phrasing closely reminiscent of the former, Chomsky
achieved an effect in linguistics very much the same as the one achieved by Popper in philosophy (cf. fn.1);
but linguistics, unlike philosophy, never fully recovered from the blow. Not only discovery rules, as conceived
by descriptivists, but the mere word “discovery” have eversince acquired strongly negative connotations for
the influential transformational grammarians, so that many other linguists have had to be very diplomatic
on the subject. This holds even for some outstanding linguists, ouside the transformational school.
Thus, some linguists with continuing methodological interests have taken much care to divert an eventual
suspicion that their concerns have anything to do with discovery, claiming their work to fall entirely into the
line of justification; cf. e.g. Leech 1970, Labov 1971:413-414.
Curiously, attempts have been made to re-interpret the work of the very proponents of discovery, the
descriptivists, in the line of justification, e.g. Lyons 1970, Miller 1973, Sampson 1979, just in order to
rehabilitate them in the hypersensitive eyes of Chomskyans. Taking for granted that a concern with discovery
is sinful, it was claimed that:
...it is undeniable that the leading theorists /as Bloomfield, Harris, Hockett, Wells/ (with the
exception of Pike) were not concerned with the development of discovery procedures.
...in the work of these linguistis a distinction is carefully drawn between the actual process of
discovering the structure of a language and the business of describing a structure which has
already been discovered. (Miller 1973: 123).
It was only the minor representatives of the school, then, who could be charged with being friends of
discovery:
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Whereas the four linguists cited in the preceding paragraph were the leading theoreticians of the
structuralist school, there were many linguists, less theoretically minded, who did interpret these
techniques of segmentation as discovery techniques for use in the field. (Miller 1973: 125).
2.2 Naive Inductivism
Another major factor contributing to the neglect of the study of discovery issues in linguistics is a view
which may be called “naive inductivism”. What I have in mind is not some worked out system of beliefs,
or a coherent theory, but rather some disparate and vague sentiments, sometimes deeply rooted in linguistic
conscience, as to the primary and exclusive role of “data gathering” and “observation/generalization” in the
process of linguistic discovery. The common implication of all these sentiments is the denial of the existence
of any systematic rules for discovery.
Below I mention two common embodiments of naive inductivism, briefly revealing their weaknesses.
2.2.1 The Immediate-Induction-of-Hypothesis Belief
This amounts to looking upon the process of discovery of a hypothesis (or problem solution) as springing
immediately—and without appeal to any systematic modes of reasoning—from “observation” and “general-
ization” of the data gathered.
This form of naive inductivism, however, faces serious difficulties (in fact well-known from the writings
of philosophers like Popper and Nagel, among others).
• First, mere observation or data gathering—without some prior hypothesis/problem—is a poor starting
point for making a discovery since we do not know just which facts to observe or gather. What we need
is the relevant facts, which, obviously, presupposes that we already dispose of a hypothesis/problem.
• Secondly, generalizing from facts is (or at least, may be) an activity which is strictly rule-governed,
quite the opposite of what the linguistic proponents of this view suppose.
• And, thirdly, from a body of data not just one, but, as a rule, innumerable inductive generalizations
can be made, so that we need to employ plausibility considerations to constrain the choice, and this,
again, is liable to rules.
2.2.2 The Large-Quantity-of-Data Belief
This sentiment assumes that what facts perhaps cannot do, many facts can, and can be traced in linguistic
remarks, with markedly positive connotation, to the effect that someone “is true to the facts” or “bases
his/her analysis on large corpuses of data”, etc. Conversely, other linguists are ridiculed for for “having
analysed three sentences and a half”. Consider also the following quote from an authorative source on the
history of linguistics:
There are periods in the history of linguistics which look very much like revolutions and sudden
shifts of paradigm, but in my opinion the most striking aspect of our science is the gradual
accumulation over the century of an immense knowledge about language...To become aware of
this may perhaps be one of the most significant revolutions in linguistics. (Hovdhaugen 1982:
11; italics mine).
This form of inductivism is also very vulnerable.
• First, and this point seems quite obvious, the great bulks of data in themselves are not only not
conducive to making a discovery, but are also of a significant obstacle to it, the selection of the relevant
facts becoming a more difficult task with the increase of these facts.
• And, in the second place, any (linguistic) discovery, contrary to the tenet discussed, is as a rule
empirically underdetermined. Norbert Wiener, for instance, has wittily described the situation. To the
question “On how many instances would you be willing to base a generalization?” he is reported to
have answered “Two instances would be nice, but one is enough!” (cited in (Wartowski 1980: 6).
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Concluding this section, we should note that despite the marked tendency in current linguistics to dis-
regard, or even be hostile to, the problems of discovery some linguists remained outside the mainstream
(cf. esp. Botha 1980 who devotes a whole chapter to a (philosophically-oriented) treatment of linguistic
discovery). However, there is clearly a need for more investment of effort. This paper is a contribution to
this trend, but focuses on computational implementation (cf. also Pericliev 1990) where some heuristics are
illustrated with a real research problem; a book on linguistic discovery is under preparation).
3 Mill’s Methods for Induction
Summarizing the well-known ideas of the “Experimental Science” of the philosopher F. Bacon, J. S. Mill (Mill
1879) formulated several methods (“canons”) for discovery of “causally” related facts in a set of instances
(observations). 2
Mill’s methods assume that each observation consists of a set of putative causes (or “accompanying
facts/circumstances”) for an effect, their aim, as eliminative induction methods, being to eliminate, from
the set of putative causes, all but the “actual” one(s).
Below we state Mill’s heuristics in his own formulation. Then, the heursitics are provided with somewhat
simplistic linguistic examples, and their implications for the computational modeling of (linguistic) discovery
are briefly discussed.
3.1 The Methods
In the following, “→” means “accompanies”, “⇒” mea ns “causes”, “⇔” means “either causes or is an effect
of”; ca pital letters denote circumstances, and small-case letters the “phenomena” investigated.
(1) The Method of Agreement (MA). If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have
only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause
(or effect) of the given phenomenon. Schematically:
A,B,C → a,b,c
A,D,E → a,d,e
A ⇔ a
(2) The Method of Difference (MD). If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs,
and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one
occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or
the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon. Schematically:
A,B,C → a,b,c
B,C → b,c
A ⇔ a
(3) The Method of Residues (MR). Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous
inductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of
the remaining antecedents. Symbolically:
A,B → a,b
B ⇒ b
A ⇒ a
(4) The Method of Concomitant Variations (MCV). Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner when-
ever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that
phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation. Symbolically (an apostrophe
denotes a variation):
2On a common understanding causality is the logical relation “If A, then B”, where the antecedent A is called a “cause” and
the consequent B is called an “effect”, e.g. Harre´. Saying that the cause A has an effect B (or that A causes B) then means
simply that A is an invariable antecedent of B, or equivalently, that B occurs whenever A occurs.
4
A,B,C → a,b,c
A’,B,C → a’, b,c
A ⇔ a
3.2 Examples
Assume now that we are given the morpheme decomposition of (English) words, as well as their decomposition
into constituent meanings, and we inquire about the morpheme-meaning correspondences.
From the following observations, by MA, we may infer that “let” and “diminutive” are causally connected.
book,let → ’book’,diminutive
leaf,let → ’leaf’,diminutive
book,let,s → ’book’,diminutive
let ⇔ diminutive
Thus, since only the morpheme “let” occurs when the resultant meaning (=effect) “diminutive” occurs,
while the other accompanying facts (“book”, “leaf” or “s”) vary, we conclude that “let” causes (or is an
effect of) “diminutive”.
The following two are self-explanatory examples of the MD and MR, respectively.
book,let → ’book’,diminutive
book → ’book’
let ⇔ diminutive
book,let,s → ’book’,diminutive, plural
book ⇒ ’book’
s ⇒ plural
let ⇒ diminutive
As an illustration of the fourth method Mill proposed, the MCV, consider how one can infer a causal
link between accent and grammatical meaning on the basis of the obseration that the shift of the accent of
a word (as e.g. in “condu`ct” and “co`nduct”) leads to a correspondiong shift of the grammati cal meaning,
verbal in the first case, and nominal in the second: 3
conduct,accent(u) → gr-meaning(verb)
conduct,accent(o) → gr-meaning(name)
accent(x) ⇔ gram-meaning(y)
3.3 Some Implications
The above methods have several features which make their computational modeling in a linguistic system of
considerable interest:
3.3.1 Generality
The methods’ generality, as reflected in their domain- and subject-independence, makes them applicable to
a wide range of linguistic discoveries in diverse linguistic fields. Indeed, it is well known that a substantial
part of linguistic “laws” are in fact empirical regularities, falling under the general schema ’Forms/meanings
of type A correspond to/cause forms/meanings of type B’ at the different linguistic levels.
For instance, one of the founders of modern linguistics characterized synchronic linguistics as finding
form-meaning correspondences: “In human speech, different sounds have different meanings. To study the
coordination of certain sounds with certain meanings is to study language.” (Bloomfield 1933). A basic
task in diachronic (historical) linguistics is the study of causation of language change in both sounds and
meanings. The study of language universals, as initiated by J. Greenberg, most often amounts to finding
so-called “implicational universals”, etc.
3The method is also particularly applicable to quantitative terms.
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3.3.2 Psychological Plausibility
Mill’s methods are psychologically plausible insofar as they are simple and perfectly natural reasoning modes.
4 So they have been widely used in the process of linguistic inquiry. Their use may be unconscious (often
disguised as specific “(litmus) tests”, “discovery procedures”, etc., in fact directly based on Mill’s canons),
or it may be conscious (e.g. J. Greenberg has recently attributed the discovery of the famous Verner’s law to
his use of the MD). Psychological plausibility is a further feature which a discovery system may profitably
possess.
3.3.3 Historical Importance
Finally, the embedding of historically important methods into computational systems may serve as test of
the particular ideas underlying these methods, and more generally, as a test of the challenging idea of the
possibility for a purely “mechanistic discovery”.
4 System Overview and Examples
MILL is a system incorporating the above heuristics. It does not make the minute distinctions Mill assumes
in the conclusions of the methods; 5 for user-specified cause-sets and effect-sets in observations it merely
identifies a cause for an effect (or vice versa). MILL’s data representation is a simple Object-Attribute-Value
knowledge structure. Its discovery process is, in essence, an attempt to apply one or more of the above
methods. The system iterates through the knowledge base, trying to apply a method. After each successful
application, a further simple heuristic is used, the Elimination Method (EM), known to everyone of us, which
checks in the data base whether a putative cause always produces the same effect, and if not, rejects the
conjecture. A successful conjecture is attempted to be proven by a further method, and the result is recorded.
The system repeats this process until all possibilities are exhausted.
As output, MILL produces two interrelated structures, constituting its discoveries:
(1) a set of the causally related facts; 6
(2) an elementary form of “explanation” for the system’s reasoning behaviour, comprising the methods
employed to draw a conclusion, as well as the data used to this end.
In the present implementation, structure (2) is only useful if the system is being used as a tool by a linguist
as an information helping him/her evaluate the solutions’ degree of plausibility. Thus, some methods (e.g.
MD) give more plausible results than others (e.g. MA); a discovery using both (i.e. the Joint Method of
Agreement and Difference) 7 is more plausible than such using either taken in isolation, etc.
The operation of the system may be better understood by examining particular examples.
4.1 A Simple Deciphering Problem
A text is given, consisting of six phrases in an unknown language A, together with their translational
equivalents into another unknown language, B. 8 The task is to find the translational equivalents of the
following two words from language B: sˇth and hzbwb.
4This could be explained by noting that the methods actually yield demonstrative inferences, only making the assumptions
that all accompanying circumstances are enumerated and that there is no more than one cause for an effect; the process of
elimination itself is indeed trivial. One is reminded in this context of the words of Bacon in Novum Organum that his Method
of discovery of sciences leaves little to the acuteness and strength of wit, and indeed levels wit and intellect.
5Cf. e.g. MD, where the conclusion is “the effect or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause”.
6An elementary query to the system is of the form causation(Cause,Effect), where “Cause” and “Effect” stand for arbitrary
terms, variables or constants; a particular problem formulation may be stated in terms of any elementary queries, connected
by logical operators.
7This is actually a somewhat different interpretation of the Joint Method than Mill gives.
8This problem is adapted from (Zaliznjak 1963: 141). In fact, language A is Albanian, and language B, Old Jewish. The
Albanian text is given in the usual orthography. For the old Jewish text, the Latin transliteration of consonantal writing is
given.
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No. CAUSES (lg A) EFFECTS (lg B)
1. mize¨, pi ysˇth, zbwb
2. miza, pinin sˇtw, zbwbym
3. mize¨, pinte sˇth, zbwb
4. mizat, pine ysˇtw, hzbwbym
5. miza, pine ysˇtw, zbwbym
6. miza, pi ysˇth, hzbwb
The data representation is Object-Attribute-Value. The first observation e.g. will be represented as
observation(no(1), cause-set([mize¨, pi]), effect-set([ysˇth, zbwb])), meaning that the object “observation” has
three attributes, number, cause-set and effect-set with their corresponding values. The system knows that
the order of symbols in the cause-set and effect-set is insignificant.
Needing to find the correspondences in language A of two specific words from language B, the prob-
lem will be formulated as follows: ?- causality(Cause1,sˇth) ∧ causality(Cause2,hzbwb). (Varaibles
begin with a capital letter, and constants with a small-case letter.) MILL will try to apply one of the
methods, looking first for the cause of
sˇth. Since this word occurs only in obs. No. 3, no other method except MR is applicable, and it will
choose MR. Applying MR will invoke a further subgoal, viz. that of finding—by some of the heuristics—the
cause of zbwb, the other word in the effect-set of obs. No. 3. zbwb occurs in obs. Nos. 1 and 3 and is provable,
by MA, to correspond to mize¨. This being the case, what remains to be the cause of sˇth, according to MR,
is pinte. The Elimination Method does not disconfirm the conjecture pinte ⇒ sˇth. In a perfectly analogous
way MILL will solve the second subgoal, finding the cause of hzbwb to be miza.
4.2 Grimm’s Law
Consider the following data, compiled from Mincoff (1967: 77), which obeys the well-known Consonant Shift,
familiar under the name “Grimm’s Law” (1822); The Indo-European sounds (exemplified by the Latin words
in the left column) are taken as the causes of the Germanic sounds (exemplified by the Old English words
in the right column).
No. CAUSES EFFECTS
1. t,u δ,u¯
2. t,r,e¯,s δ,r,e,e
3. p,a,t,e,r f,a,δ,e,r
4. p,e¯,s f,o¯,t
5. p,e,c,u f,e,o,h
6. n,e,p,o¯,s n,e,f,a
7. d,u,o t,w,a¯
8. d,e,c,e,m t,e¯,n
Let the problem be to discover the consonantal alternations exhibited in the data.
To solve the problem MILL will need an explicit encoding of the domain knowledge as to what of the
symbols in the data base are c(onsonants) and what are v(owels). The representation, containing this
information, taking as an illustration e.g. obs. No. 4 will be observation(no(4),cause-set([c:p,v:e¯,c:s]), effect-
set([c:f,v:o¯,c:t])).
The problem formulation, unputted to the system, will be:
?- causation(c:Cause,c:Effect).
Now we may look briefly at the discovery process. Trying to apply MA, the system notices in observations
Nos. 1 and 2 the single co-occurring symbol in their cause-sets,t , and the single co-occurring symbol in their
effect-sets, δ. 9 Then it proceeds with EM. This test succeeding, since whenever t occurs δ also occurs
(as in obs. No. 3) and there is no contradicting data in the base, it is hypothesized that t causes δ. This
hypothesis is then attempted to be proven by a further method (failing in this particular case), and the
result is recorded.
By the same method, from observations Nos. 3 and 4, the system will hypothesize that p causes f , the
EM will succeed since in observations Nos. 5 and 6 where p occurs the conjectured correspondence f also
9The same conjecture could also have been made by the same method from observations Nos. 1 and 3, had the system used
another mode of scanning tha data base than the top-down one.
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occurs, and p causes f will be assumed. Again using the MA, and simialr reasoning route the system will
infer from observations Nos. 7 and 8 that d causes t.
MILL has thus re-discovered the Indo-European–Germanic consonantal alternations t > δ, p > f, d > t,
which form a part of the famous Grimm’s Law (1882). 10
5 Conclusion
At this stage of development, MILL has certain limitations, arising both from Mill’s conception (our in-
terpretation) of causality and the implementation. To mention but one thing, it is incapable of handling
“exceptions”. E.g. had we encountered in our data base of the consonantal alternation problem an observa-
tion such as Latin sto¯ O.E. standan, MILL would have never found the change t > δ. Nevertheless, it will
be clear that a discovery process, relying on Mill’s methods, will make a system simple, and at the same
time quite general and powerful; thus the system has re-discovered a number of further sound laws, and
was successfully tested in its role as a tool in the solutions of diverse “field” linguistic problems. Finally,
although we have considered only linguistic discovery, the system may be, obviously, applied to discovering
empirical regularities in other fields as well.
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